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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the debate over public participation in criminal justice. On one side of this debate 
are those who argue that criminal justice policy should be removed from direct political ± and hence 
public ± control, and delegated to an insulated panel of experts. On the other are those who argue that 
the public has to have a decisive role in criminal justice policy, even if we should agree that electoral 
politics is not a meaningful or constructive form of public participation. One important point at issue 
between the two sides is whether insulating key policy decisions in criminal justice would be 
undemocratic, and whether it matters if it is. Answering this question will require us to say something 
about the nature and value of democracy, and about the kinds of decision-making institutions that 
democracy requires. To this end, this paper to provide a number of reasons we might have for 
approving of public participation. Once these reasons are articulated, we can use them to inform the 
question of how we might reform and rebuild criminal justice institutions to give the public a more 
productive role.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper I aim to clarify and further the debate over public participation in 
criminal justice. On one side of this debate are those who argue that the impact of 
public opinion has distorted criminal justice policy, giving politicians an incentive to 
introduce harsh policies of dubious effectiveness, and that the solution lies in 
removing criminal justice policy from direct political ± and hence public ± control. 
On the other are those who argue that the public has to have a decisive role in 
FULPLQDOMXVWLFHSROLF\DQGWKDWWKHSUREOHPVDULVLQJIURPµSHQDOSRSXOLVP¶VKRZQRW
that public participation is bad as such, but simply that the way that electoral politics 
engages the public in decision-making can be highly problematic. On this latter view, 
we should agree that electoral politics is not a meaningful or constructive form of 
public participation, but ZHKDYHJURXQGVWREHVNHSWLFDOZKHWKHUµH[SHUW¶GHFLVLRQ-
making, uncoupled from public scrutiny and input, will always lead to optimal 
RXWFRPHVIXUWKHUPRUHLWLVDQHYDVLRQRIFLWL]HQV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWRZDUGVWKHµGLUW\
EXVLQHVV¶RIFULPLQDOMXVWLFHLIZHOHDYHH[SHUWVWRPDNHGHFLVLRQVIURPZKLFKZHFDQ
then avert our gaze. The lesson, according to this latter view, is that we need to think 
harder about the way the public are empowered to engage in decision-making.  
 
One important point at issue between the two sides is whether insulating key policy 
decisions in criminal justice would be undemocratic, and whether it matters if it is. 
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Answering this question will require us to say something about the nature and value 
of democracy, as well as saying something about the kinds of decision-making 
institutions that democracy requires. To this end, I aim in this paper to provide a 
number of reasons we might have for approving of public participation. Once these 
reasons are articulated, we can use them to inform the question of how we might 
reform and rebuild criminal justice institutions to give the public a more productive 
role. My aim in this paper is mainly to give a clear articulation of the ground on 
which this debate should proceed, and to show how we can begin to assess the 
strength of these arguments. While a (critical) friend of the pro-public-participation 
side,1 I do not regard the argument as being settled, and I aim to show some of the 
challenges that lie ahead in making the case for this side of the argument.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I outline the view that we need a 
mechanism whereby criminal justice policy can be insulated from certain forms of 
public input. I look at the concern that this move might be undemocratic, as well as 
some responses to this concern. In section 3, I move to the other side of the debate, 
looking at the work of Albert Dzur. Dzur argues that the real solution to penal 
populism is greater public input. In section 4 I try to clarify the grounds of the debate 
between Dzur and his opponents, and I put forward eight theses that might be 
advanced by Dzur in defence of his claims; doing so allows us also to see KRZ']XU¶V
opponents might respond, and therefore how the debate might be pushed forward. 
After some evaluative discussion of these claims, section 5 concludes with some 
further reflections.  
 
2. Is the weakening of public control over criminal justice policy undemocratic? 
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Reviewing WKHWZHOYHµLQGLFHVRIFKDQJH¶ZLWKLQFRQWHPSRUDU\(Anglo-American) 
criminal justice systems that David Garland lists at the outset of The Culture of 
Control, the reader cannot help but see an overall picture emerge. According to this 
picture criminal justice policy has altered over the past thirty or forty years (for the 
worse?) as a result of the increased assertiveness, or at least the increased influence, 
of a criminologically-unsophisticated public.2 µ7KHGHFOLQHRIWKHUHKDELOLWDWLYHLGHDO¶
µWKHUH-HPHUJHQFHRISXQLWLYHVDQFWLRQVDQGH[SUHVVLYHMXVWLFH¶WKHFKDQJLQJ
µHPRWLRQDOWRQH¶RIFULPLQDOMXVWLFHSROLF\DQGµSROLWLFLVDWLRQDQGWKHQHZSRSXOLVP¶
the suggestion, at first glance at least, is of untutored retributive public sentiments 
usurping the role previously occupied by penological experts, emotion replacing 
UHDVRQ*DUODQGH[SUHVVHVWKLVYLHZRIWKHULVHRIµSHQDOSRSXOLVP¶DVIROORZV 
 
µ7KHUHis now a distinctly populist current in penal politics that denigrates 
H[SHUWDQGSURIHVVLRQDOHOLWHVDQGFODLPVWKHDXWKRULW\RI³WKHSHRSOH´RI
FRPPRQVHQVHRI³JHWWLQJEDFNWREDVLFV´7KHGRPLQDQWYRLFHRIFULPH
policy is no longer the expert or even the practitioner but that of the long-
suffering, ill-served people ± HVSHFLDOO\RI³WKHYLFWLP´DQGWKHIHDUIXO
anxious members of the public. A few decades ago public opinion functioned 
as an occasional brake on policy initiatives: now it operates as a privileged 
source. The importance of research and criminological knowledge is 
GRZQJUDGHGDQGLQLWVSODFHLVDQHZGHIHUHQFHWRWKHYRLFHRI³H[SHULHQFH´
RI³FRPPRQVHQVH´RI³ZKDWHYHU\RQHNQRZV´¶3  
 
Garland is careful to leave it ambiguous whether the group that has usurped the 
criminal justice agenda is the public itself, or rather some elite group that claims to 
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speak on behalf of the people ± perhaps for its own ends.4 For instance, does the 
DSSURSULDWLRQRIWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHPE\µWKHSXEOLF¶UHSUHVHQWJHQXLQHSRSXODU
FRQWURORULVWKHDSSHDOWRWKHµSXEOLF¶VLPSO\DGHYLFHHPSOR\HGE\SROLWLFLDQV± and 
those in whose interests they act ± to win votes and further specific political ends? 
$UHWKHSXEOLFUHDOO\VXEMHFWWRWKHµIHDURIFULPH¶and the retributive passions that 
DSSHDURQ*DUODQG¶VSLFWXUHWREHGULYLQJWKHSROLWLFDODJHQGD"5 We will come back 
to these questions later. 
 
However we should understand the deeper significance of what is going on, the 
phenomena that feed this analysis seem to be reasonably clear. Greater use of 
imprisonment and longer prison sentences; prison conditions that arguably violate 
human rights; the widespread denial to prisoners of basics of citizenship such as a 
ULJKWWRYRWHµWKUHHVWULNHVDQG\RX¶UHRXW¶SROLFLHVWKDWKDYHWKHHIIHFWRIEULQJLQJ
more people into the criminal justice system as a result of minor criminality; victim 
LPSDFWVWDWHPHQWVDWVHQWHQFLQJ0HJDQ¶VODZVFLYLFDQGHPSOR\PHQWUHVWULFWLRQVRQ
WKRVHZLWKDFULPLQDOUHFRUG«PHDVXUHVRI questionable impact on real public safety 
are introduced in the apparent hope of satisfying a perceived public appetite, while 
experts, evidence and experience are neglected or even denigrated and ridiculed.6 
Furthermore, one key driver of this nexus between assertive public punitiveness and 
political power has been the electoral system.7 Politicians have found that appealing 
to simple messages about crime control and individual responsibility ± SURWHFWLQJµXV¶
DJDLQVWµWKHP¶ZKRZRXOGWKUHDWHQXV± has led to electoral success, and whatever the 
complexities that lie behind this fact, it has prevented the development of a serious 
and evidence-sensitive debate about crime in countries like the U.S. and the U.K.. 
Those at the sharp end of mass incarceration ± often those who are already the most 
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vulnerable in our societies ± have been the needless victims of this rise in the 
temperature of the public mood and its political expression.  
 
In the face of this problem, what is to be done? A characteristic liberal response is to 
try to take criminal justice off the political agenda. For Nicola Lacey, for instance, a 
way out of the toxic mix of criminal justice and electoral politics  
 
µ«ZLOOEHSRVVLEOHRQO\LIWKHWZRPDLQSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVFDQUHDFKD
framework agreement about the removal of criminal justice policy ± or at least 
of key aspects of policy, such as the size of the prison system ± from party 
political debate. This might be done by setting up an initial Royal 
Commission, or something of yet wider scope, in an effort to generate an 
expanded debate that takes in not only the widest possible range of social 
groups but also a broad range of the non-penal policies and institutions on 
ZKLFKFULPLQDOMXVWLFHSUDFWLFHVEHDU«$IXUWKHULPSRUWDQWFRQGLWLRQZRXOG 
be the re-constitution of some respect for expertise in the field. As such it 
would be important not only to have the Commission serviced by a substantial 
expert bureaucracy but also, following implementation of its conclusions, to 
consign the development of particular aspects of future criminal justice policy 
to institutions encompassing both wide representation and expertise. In other 
words, the removal of criminal justice policy from party political competition 
would open up the possibility of the kind of solution to fiscal policy 
LPSOHPHQWHGWKURXJKWKH0RQHWDU\3ROLF\&RPPLWWHH03&«%\
conferring the task of setting interest rates to an independent body of experts 
ORFDWHGLQWKH%DQNRI(QJODQGPDNLQJWKLVERG\¶VGHOLEHUDWLRQVWUDQVSDUHQW
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and setting up robust mechanisms of accountability to parliament, Gordon 
Brown crafted a strategy which has commanded remarkable public and 
SROLWLFDOVXSSRUW¶/DFH\SS-2.) 
 
So should we seek to create a criminal justice version of the U.K. Monetary Policy 
Committee, into whose hands responsibility for key policy decisions should be 
placed, rather than having them made by politicians who are more directly 
accountable to the electorate?8 The problem that we will be looking at in this paper is 
that this might look undemocratic. After all, two large, but in principle attractive, 
principles might suggest that such a move would involve taking decisions away from 
the public that they have a right to make: first of all, that the rationale of institutions 
like the criminal justice system is to serve the public, and so the formulation and 
H[HFXWLRQRIFULPLQDOMXVWLFHSROLF\KDVWRUHPDLQLQWKHHQGWKHSXEOLF¶VEXVLQHVVDQG
secondly, that the ultimate source of authority in the state is the people as a whole ± 
so no LQVWLWXWLRQFDQOHJLWLPDWHO\DFWLQWKHSXEOLF¶VQDPHZLWKRXWWKHSXEOLF¶VVD\-so. 
These two claims seem to speak in favour of ultimate control over public policy 
resting in the hands of the public. 
 
Lacey is careful, however, not to argue that democracy is unimportant. Democracy is 
important, in her view, but it is simply not the only thing that is important. Also 
important are values such as inclusivity and respect for rights ± values, to be sure, not 
unrelated to the values of democracy, but which can come into conflict with some of 
the claims that are made for democratic procedures of transparency, popular choice 
and accountability of public decisions. Furthermore, given that democracy 
encompasses a wide and variable set of values and claims, the answer to the question 
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of which model of democracy is appropriate for a given political community at a 
given time will depend, not simply on abstract ideal theorizing (although that will also 
have its place), but on the structural socio-economic conditions faced by a particular 
polity at a particular moment in history. In other words, the implementation of a set of 
procedures for popular control that may be perfectly appropriate in one set of political 
circumstances might lead to intolerable violations of other important values when 
implemented willy-nilly in a quite different set of circumstances. Democracy, in a 
nutshell, is a value, but a value representing a weighty responsibility that needs to be 
used wisely. Where a demos has proven itself unable to exercise it wisely ± perhaps 
for structural reasons as much as any moral or volitional failure ± it can be the best 
thing to do, all things considered, to take some of those responsibilities away. As 
Lacey has it: 
 
µ:KLOHDFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGUHVSRQVLYHQHVVDUHLQGifferent guises, constants in 
democratic theory, they are in potential conflict with other values such as the 
aspiration to foster an inclusionary criminal justice policy. And this conflict may 
be accentuated by the particular institutional constraints under which different 
VRUWVRIGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQPHQWVRSHUDWH¶/DFH\ 
 
There are, therefore, a number of broad lines of response to the charge that taking 
criminal justice policy out of direct political control in the way that Lacey suggests is 
undemocratic. 1) We might reject the importance of democracy outright ± on the 
basis, say, that the demos is lacking in the key expertise necessary to make decisions 
about criminal justice, and that it is crazy to put the fools in charge of the ship when 
there is a qualified captain at hand. 2) More sympathetic to democracy, we might 
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nevertheless argue that it is not the only game in town. For instance, values of 
democracy might come into conflict with values of inclusion or basic rights and 
interests. 3) Even more sympathetic to democracy, we might nevertheless say that 
there are various conceptions of democracy, and that it is not clear that taking some 
decisions away from the people is undemocratic, at least where the decisions that are 
made are transparent and there is some manner of accountability. Another example, 
besides the Monetary Policy Committee, is of course the judiciary, in particular the 
institution of a constitutional court the authority of which is supreme over legislators. 
Many would say that democracy has to consist in more than just popular sovereignty, 
at least if this is construed as the idea that any policy affirmed by a quorate majority 
vote is legitimate. Democracy is at least in part grounded in a belief in the basic 
equality of each citizen, and this has led many to think that a political system in which 
the popular vote is constrained from passing laws that would violate that basic 
equality (e.g. laws that would deny some citizens a basic standard of treatment, as in 
an apartheid system), for instance by a constitution containing a bill of fundamental 
rights, is not undemocratic.  
 
Furthermore, finally, 4) we might argue that there is no incompatibility, in principle, 
between democracy and the delegation of powers to representative or expert bodies to 
carry out particular functions ± including functions of policy-setting.9 The MPC 
would not be illegitimately usurping any functions that should belong to the demos, it 
might be said, as long as the demos has authorized it to carry out that job. Democratic 
authorization is a bit like a collective version of consent ± a transfer of rights from 
one party to another, or an endowment of rights on one party by another. Your taking 
my property without my say-so would be an illegitimate denial of my authority over 
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it, and hence theft; but once authorized by me to take it, you are within your rights to 
do so. Similarly, it might be said, there is no conflict with the authority of democracy 
if an expert body is democratically authorized to make those decisions. There is no 
incompatibility between delegation and democracy. If there were nothing more to 
democracy than the importance of collective authorization then this would 
definitively answer the charge that insulating sentencing policy from popular control 
is undemocratic. 
 
3. A dissenting voice: in favour of greater public participation 
In his book Punishment, Participatory Democracy and the Jury, and a series of 
articles, Albert Dzur has argued for a different view.10 2Q']XU¶VDOWHUQDWLYHLWLVQRW
public participation in criminal justice as such that is the problem. Rather the problem 
is a democratic deficit in criminal justice, and it is greater and more meaningful 
democracy that is required to get us out of it.  
 
µ7KHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHGLVFRXUVHRQ the penal state views populism in a negative 
and monochromatic light, overlooking the constructive tendencies of populist 
movements historically and neglecting the possibility that public involvement 
could lead to less rather than more punitive policy in FRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFV¶11  
 
&DOOLQJ/DFH\¶VVXJJHVWLRQµWKHWHFKQRFUDWLFUHVSRQVHWRSHQDOSRSXOLVP¶S
Dzur claims that it faces a number of practical and normative problems. First of all, he 
ZRUULHVWKDWWKHUHLVDµODFNRIZLOORUSROLWLFDOFDSLWDOWRODXQFKVXFKUHIRUPV¶LQGHHG
this practical problem is implicit in the diagnosis of the problems to which this 
response is meant to be a solution, namely, the decline in public deference to expert 
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bodies (p. 31). Secondly, even if such a committee could get off the ground, it would 
be unlikely to be effective in the long-term because it fails to engage the public and 
hence engender the support and understanding that are necessary for any public body 
to command allegiance (p. 30). Thirdly, and fundamentally, policies such as that 
VXJJHVWHGE\/DFH\µLPSO\WKDWWKHSXEOLFLVXQDEOHWRVHOI-regulate, unable to own up 
to a more measured approach to criminal justice, to punish but in a more thoughtful, 
consistent and humane fashion without strict elite guidDQFH¶S']XU
acknowledges that Lacey might respond in the way we have considered above: that 
there is no incompatibility between democracy and insulating protection of 
fundamental rights, or between democracy and delegation. But he makes three points: 
i) that it is not clear that an insulated sentencing committee would be making only 
technical decisions, and that the political part of their decision-making should in a 
democracy be the business of the public; ii) that crimes are thought of, in 
BlackstRQH¶VWHUPVDVµSXEOLFZURQJV¶DQGKHQFHDVDFWVWKHQDWXUHRIZKLFKWKH
public is intimately concerned; and iii) it is to treat the public, from whom we can and 
VKRXOGH[SHFWPRUHDVOHJLWLPDWHO\µFDUHOHVVUHJDUGLQJWKHOLYHVRIRWKHUV¶12 
 
By contrast, Dzur argues that the problems of penal populism have come about, not 
because of too much democracy or public input, but rather because of insufficient or 
inappropriate forms of public input. The solution to this problem is not to sacrifice the 
demands of democracy to the more urgent demands of inclusivity and human rights, 
but rather to increase or improve the way the public are involved in the formulation 
and implementation of criminal justice policy. Dzur points out that concerns about 
penal populism emerge at the same time as social theorists started worrying about the 
GHFOLQHRIVRFLDOFDSLWDODQGWKHµKROORZLQJRXW¶RIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUHWKXVWKHUHVHHPV
  
12 
like a contradictory movement of both too much public control at the same time as not 
enough public engagement. 
 
µ+RZWRPDNHVHQVHRIWKLVSDUDGR[RIWRRPXFKSRSXODUSDUWLFLSDWLRQDOEHLW
concentrated on a specific set of issues, and too little at the same time? The 
best way is to see penal populism as a case of democratic deficit not surplus, a 
popular movement without the kind of social capital that would lead to 
constructive engagement in criminal justice policymaking. How the public 
ZDVPRELOL]HGDQGZKDWLWZDVPRELOL]HGWRDFFRPSOLVKDUHFULWLFDO«>3HQDO
populism] is best understood, then, not as a failure to protect the system from 
public participation but as a failure to incorporate it in a constructive, 
GLDORJLFDOZD\¶13  
 
$QLPSRUWDQWLOOXVWUDWLRQRI']XU¶VSRLQWKHUHLVDGLVWLQFWLRQWKDWKHGUDZVRQWKH
basis of work by Harry Boyte between two ways of engaging the public: a 
mobilization strategy; and an organizing strategy. Quoting from Boyte in this passage, 
he explains the difference as follows: 
 
µ0RELOL]DWLRQVWUDWHJLHVLQWKHIRUPRIVLJQDWXUHGULYHVGRRU-to-door 
canvassing operations, or protest marches, are potent but toxic. As Boyte 
SRLQWVRXW³WKH\H[SHFWYHU\OLWWOHRIWKHFLWL]HQWKH\GHSHQGXSRQFDULFDWXUHV
of the enemy; and they are forms of citizen participation in which 
professionals craft both the message and the patterns of LQYROYHPHQW´
2UJDQL]LQJVWUDWHJLHVE\FRQWUDVWVWUHVV³SDWLHQWVXVWDLQHGZRUNLQ
FRPPXQLWLHV´³IDFHWRIDFHKRUL]RQWDOLQWHUDFWLRQVDPRQJSHRSOH´DQG
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³UHVSHFWIRUWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHDQGWDOHQWVRIRUGLQDU\XQFUHGHQWLDOHGFLWL]HQV´¶
(p. 35). 
 
Unlike mere mobilization, genuine citizen organization gives lay people the 
opportunity ± and indeed requires of them ± to engage in making key decisions 
themselves, bringing their particular skills to bear and hence contributing to a wide-
ranging collective pool of experience and knowledge, engaging in debate and thinking 
things through together, and thereby making both the resultant policy itself and the 
public support it can command more robust.  
 
2QWKHEDVLVRIWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSRWHQWLDOO\WR[LFµPRELOLVDWLRQ¶VWUDWHJ\
DQGWKHPRUHSDUWLFLSDWRU\GHOLEHUDWLYHDQGUREXVWµRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VWUDWHJ\']XU¶V
claims about penal populism can therefore be reconstructed as follows. The ramping-
up of criminal justice policy is the result of a particular form of public engagement 
characterized by a situation in which policy is formulated by political representatives 
competing for votes. This situation allows for, and even encourages, a lack of care 
and responsibility on the part of the public who are voting for one policy or another. 
5DWKHUWKDQKDYLQJWKHZHLJKWRIWKHIDWHRISDUWLFXODULQGLYLGXDOVRQRQH¶VKDQGVRQH
is rather expected to respond to caricatures and broad claims that it becomes 
LPSRVVLEOHWRYHULI\3ROLWLFLDQVDUHDGHSWDWILQGLQJDµPHVVDJH¶What will portray the 
issues in a particular way, and which will maximize the number of votes they can get. 
In such a way the public need not be seen as acting stupidly: they may be reacting 
appropriately given the way the issues are portrayed to them. But that is not the same 
end as increasing public understanding of complex and many-sided situations and 
encouraging careful examination of the issues. If the public in these circumstances 
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ends up voting for policies that reflect simple retributivist stereotypes, this is not 
because the public are incapable, if put into a situation that requires it, of dealing with 
many-sided complex problems. 
 
7KHTXHVWLRQLVWKHQZKDWIRUPVRISXEOLFµRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶DVRSSRVHGWR
µPRELOLVDWLRQ¶FRXOGZRUNLQWKHUHDOPRIFriminal justice. While some theorists of 
participatory democracy are resolutely anti-institutional and anti-government, Dzur is 
less pessimistic, seeing institutions including government as products of collective 
endeavor rather than its enemies (p. 34; pp. 52-6). While institutions can become 
dysfunctional in the absence of public involvement, this does not show them to be 
fundamentally corrupt and corrupting; participatory democracy properly understood, 
RQ']XU¶VYLHZWDNHVSODFHWKURXJKSXEOLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSUH-existing institutions. It 
is therefore not necessary for democracies to constantly reinvent the wheel by dealing 
with each social problem afresh each generation, since institutions can, at their best, 
be repositories of collective wisdom that serve the public by laying down procedures, 
and by training experts, that provide efficient ways to solve or ameliorate such 
problems ± though of course democratic input can be instrumental in stimulating 
institutions to reinvent themselves to meet the demands of new social conditions. For 
']XUWKHLGHDOFRPHVDERXWZKHUHLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHµUDWLRQDOO\GLVRUJDQLVHG¶E\WKH
introduction of lay members. Rational disorganization is an apt phrase for two 
reasons: first because lay participation makes institutions operate less efficiently, and 
thus demands that the make-up of institutions builds in the recognition of procedural 
values other than efficiency; and secondly, because lay participants are more likely to 
bend standards of procedural correctness and generalization in favour of substantive 
justice and attention to the particulars of the individual case. However, to repeat, 
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']XU¶VLGHDOLVQRWWKDWOD\SDUWLFLSDWLRQVKRXOGRYHUZKHOPRUWUXPSEXUHDXFUDtic 
rationality and its formalization of expert knowledge, but rather that lay and 
professional input should complement one another in a complex harmony or balance; 
LQVWLWXWLRQVRQKLVYLHZµDUHGLPLQLVKHGZKHQHLWKHUSURIHVVLRQDOVRUOD\SHRSOH
become domiQDQW¶S 
 
Of course, in common law systems there already exists an institution of rational 
disorganisation in the field of criminal justice, namely the jury, and it is this that Dzur 
recommends as a model for the kind of lay participation he has in mind to overcome 
WKHFULVLVLQFULPLQDOMXVWLFHµ,QVWLWXWLRQVOLNHFRXUWVQHHGUDWLRQDOGLVRUJDQLVDWLRQDV
DQDQWLGRWHWRULJLGLILHGSURIHVVLRQDOL]HGDQGUHPRWHSUDFWLFH¶S$VZHZLOOVHH
below, there is an argument that both institutions and citizens ± and, indeed, the 
relationship between them ± benefit from lay participation. However, what Dzur 
thinks of as the core importance of the jury lies elsewhere, in an elusive but 
suggestive thought not often articulated in mainstream Anglo-American political 
theory (again, we will have more to say about this below). This goes back to his view 
WKDWµWREHDJRRGFLWL]HQLVWRZRUNWRJHWKHUDQGEHDUUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHSXEOLF
VSKHUHDQGIRUWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWVKDSHVRFLDOOLIHµS+HTXRWHVIrom 
&KHVWHUWRQ¶VUHIOHFWLRQVRQWKHWULDODQGGUDZVIURPWKLVDFUXFLDOLGHD 
 
µ&KHVWHUWRQ¶VPDLQSRLQWWKDWWKHMXU\³DOORZVIUHVKEORRGDQGIUHVKWKRXJKWV
IURPWKHVWUHHWV´WRLQIXVHFRXUWURRPVWKDWRWKHUZLVHEHFRPHWKHPXQGDQH
³ZRUNVKRSV´RIFRXUWSURIessionals all too accustomed to the job, is well 
known. Equally important, I think, is its underappreciated flip side, namely, 
that the jury allows, indeed presses, ordinary citizens to take ownership of the 
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³WHUULEOHEXVLQHVV´RIFULPLQDOMXVWLFH«,QDGemocracy, citizens are not ever 
OHIWRIIWKHKRRNRIPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUSXQLVKPHQW¶S 
 
4. Some reflections on the debate: what counts in favour of public participation? 
What we have done so far is to set up a debate about the proper response to those 
indices of change noted by Garland. Either side of the debate has to hand a diagnosis 
of the problem that these changes represent and a prescription for how to address it. 
According to one side, the problem lies with the extent of involvement of public 
opinion, opinion which, given social structural realities, is not particularly tractable at 
present; this diagnosis leads to the prescription that we should insulate criminal 
justice policy from public involvement. On the other side, by contrast, the problem 
lies rather in the disconnect between policy makers and the public, where 
representatives create policies that can gain public assent on the basis of superficial 
engagement, and the prescription is, rather than creating a formally insulated but 
actually inherently fragile panel of experts (fragile because it cannot gain popular 
support), to increase meaningful public participation. 
 
This debate raises a number of questions that are beyond the remit of the paper. For 
instance, if it were unrealistic to think that there would be either the political or 
popular will ± or structural space ± to undertake the kind of participation that Dzur 
recommends, his view would be more of a long-term aspiration than a live option. 
How realistic a proposal it is is not something I will attempt to address here.14 
 
However, some aspects of the debate rest on key disagreements in political theory 
regarding the nature and value of democracy. That is: what does a system have to be 
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OLNHWRGHVHUYHWKHHSLWKHWµGHPRFUDWLF¶ZKDWLVLPSRUWDQWDERXWGHPRFUDF\DQGZKDW
institutional forms are required to put what is important about democracy into action? 
Of course, insofar as Lacey and Dzur are offering us prescriptions as to how to get out 
of the crisis, they must be drawing on some view of practical priorities and values; but 
even their diagnoses of the nature of the problem that we face are underpinned by 
different conceptions of the apt division of responsibility between citizen and state, 
conceptions underpinned by some view of the value of different forms of 
arrangement.   
 
While I will not attempt to settle this debate in this paper, I want to do some work 
clarifying the ground on which the argument will take place. So in this section I will 
set out a number of conceptions of the nature and value of democracy, and comment 
briefly on the strengths and weaknesses of these in relation to the debate we have 
been discussing. One of these will be the view of participation that Dzur finds in 
Chesterton, and which I think has been under-represented in recent discussions of 
democracy.  
 
First of all, let us set the scene by drawing a distinction between what David Held has 
FDOOHGµSURWHFWLYH¶DQGµGHYHORSPHQWDO¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIGHPRFUDF\15 While both of 
these conceptions accept basic democratic values of 1) equal liberty to live according 
WRRQH¶VRZQOLJKWVHTXDOLW\RIFRQWURORYHUWKHH[HUFLVHRISROLWLFDOSRZHUVWDWH
power being exercised only for the common good, and 4) authority resting ultimately 
with the people collectively as a whole ± values that can be thought of as implicit in 
WKHGHVFULSWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\DVµUXOHRIWKHSHRSOHE\WKHSHRSOHIRUWKHSHRSOH¶± 
the two conceptions give these features importantly different interpretations. 
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$FFRUGLQJWRWKHµSURWHFWLYH¶FRQFHSWLRQGHPRFUDWLFSURFHGXUHVDUHLQVWUXPHQWDOO\
justified as the best available means by which the individual rights can be protected 
from abuse by government and by other fellow citizens. Democracy may not be 
intrinsically just, on this conception;16 rather the justification is that a system that 
accommodates a degree of popular sovereignty, applied by representatives and 
constrained by a constitution, is a powerful way to create a social scene marked by the 
stable protection of rights and freedoms. According to the developmental conception, 
however, democracy can have something of intrinsic value to it: democracy is 
necessary, not only, as a contingent matter, for the protection of individual rights, but 
also, non-FRQWLQJHQWO\DQGFRQVWLWXWLYHO\IRUVRPHWKLQJOLNHµWKHHGXFDWLRQRIDQ
entire people to the point where their intellectual, emotional and moral capacities have 
reached their full potential and they are joined, freely and actively in a genuine 
coPPXQLW\¶17 The developmental conception need not reject constitutionalism, or 
representative democracy, or the rule of law, or those other elements that serve to 
constrain the untrammelled exercise of popular will ± or at least, it need not reject 
them entirely; nevertheless, on the developmental conception, some form of active 
HQJDJHPHQWLQWKHSROLWLFDOOLIHRIRQH¶VFRPPXQLW\LVDQDVSHFWRIWKHJRRGKXPDQ
life, and life is to some extent impoverished where this is absent.  
 
It may in the end prove too simple to say that Lacey takes the protectionist view in 
which the key role of the state lies in the establishment and maintenance of a regime 
of stable protection of the rights of all those individuals who make up the polity; 
while the conception defended by Dzur sees citizen involvement in the state as a 
necessary part of a genuinely human life; but that will be a reasonable starting point 
for our discussion. Furthermore, should Dzur be able to back this developmental 
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claim up, it will give his position some room for manoeuvre in the following sense. 
Even if it were the case that democratic institutions with a high degree of public 
participation were not the best available means to creating a stable regime where the 
interests of all can be protected ± if, for instance, as Lacey suggests, a better route 
might be to create an insulated expert committee immune to direct public 
participation and control ± there may be some further values that make these 
otherwise deficient outcomes in some way worth it. In other words, the fact that 
certain developmental values are served might make it the case that outcomes that are 
deficient in certain respects or up to a certain degree can and should be tolerated. Of 
course, this may not be the case, and it may be that public participation will make the 
system function more accurately than otherwise. We will consider some arguments 
for this conclusion below. But even if it were to turn out that this is not the case, it 
ZRXOGQRWQHFHVVDULO\IROORZWKDW']XU¶VDUJXPHQWZDVGHIHDted. Politics is always a 
function of balancing and of gain and loss ± the idea of a perfect state in which all 
YDOXHVFDQEHUHFRQFLOHGZLWKRXWPRUDOORVVLVDILJPHQWRI,VDLDK%HUOLQ¶V
imagination (though of course, he took this as a target to argue against rather than to 
endorse). The main point, though is that we should wait to see what case can be made 
for those developmental values before we conclude that the only thing that matters is 
µZKDWZRUNV¶LQSURWHFWLQJEDVLFULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWV 
 
With this by way of preamble, let us turn now to a review of reasons that favour 
public participation. I will set out eight claims that might be put forward, separately 
RUPRUHOLNHO\MRLQWO\DQGZKLFKDUHUHOHYDQWWR']XU¶VFDVHLQIDYRXURIJUHDWHU
public participation. Having presented each, I will consider some complexities and 
possible responses. This will in no way amount to a comprehensive discussion, let 
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DORQHWKHHVWDEOLVKLQJRI']XU¶VFDVH7KLVUHYLHZZLOOUDWKHU,KRSHVHUYHWKH
purposes of clarifying the nature of the debate and setting out the ground on which the 
arguments will have to take place. Nevertheless, it will also help to show, I hope, the 
argumentative resources that Dzur has on his side. 
 
It might also be useful to say something about the organization of the following 
theses. A-C can be considered as grounds for thinking that at least some of the things 
WKDWFRXQWLQIDYRXURI/DFH\¶VPRGHOZLOODOVRFRXQWLQIDYRXURI']XU¶VVRWKH
OHVVRQIURPWKHVHWKHVHVLVWKDW/DFH\¶VPRGHOKDVQRW been proven to be the better 
RQH7KHVHV'DQG(WKHQSRLQWWRSUREOHPVWKDWPLJKWDULVHIURP/DFH\¶VPRGHODQG
KHQFHDGYDQWDJHVRI']XU¶V7KHQZLWK)*DQG+ZHJHWWRWKHKHDUWRI']XU¶VFDVH
± these are the key questions that will need to be worked through in order to decide 
KRZFRPSHOOLQJKLVFRQFOXVLRQVDUH)RULQVWDQFHLI)µ7KH&RUUHFWLRQ7KHVLV¶LV
true, or at least partially true, then all the other theses  would become immediately 
more appealing as a package; if it is not true, we face difficult choices. 
 
A. The Defusion Thesisµ7KHPRVWXUJHQWQHHGLVWRWDNHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHRIIWKH
agenda of electoral politics. But this could be done equally well by having key 
decisions made by a jury, or a commission on which there would be significant lay 
PHPEHUVKLSDVLWZRXOGE\WKHLQVWLWXWLRQRIDFRPPLVVLRQRIH[SHUWV¶ 
 
7KHTXHVWLRQFULWLFVZRXOGDVNLVZKDWLVPHDQWE\µFRXOGEHGRQHHTXDOO\ZHOO¶2Q
the one hand, it means merely that the use of the jury is another option for insulating 
key decisions from electoral politics. That is true. But is it an equally good, or even a 
better option than a sentencing commission? That, of course, depends on what further 
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values are served, either by having the jury make the decisions, or having a 
commission do so. So this thesis cannot be persuasive until we have said some more 
on that front. 
 
B. The Legitimacy Thesisµ7KHVRXUFHRIXOWLPDWHDXWKRULW\LVWKHSHRSOHVRWKH\
should have the final say over the exercise of collective coercive power. Therefore 
criminal justice policy cannot be legitimate without there having been a prior act of 
collective authorization by the body with ultimate authority: i.e. the people. 
Authorisation via plebiscite is impractical for anything beyond the very basic 
principles of sentencing policy. Given that more detailed authorization is needed, and 
that seeking such authorization through electoral politics have proven so damaging in 
other ways, an alternative source of authorization would be assent from a majority 
vote amongst a jury of citizens who can, by virtue of random selection, stand for the 
SHRSOH¶ 
 
The burden of this thesis is to suggest that the decision of a randomly-selected jury 
can be a source of democratic legitimacy. If successful it would answer those who 
assume that democratic legitimacy can only come through the decisions of elected 
officials (or those appointed or endorsed by such officials). However, to answer this 
question decisively would require a theory of what legitimacy consists in and how it 
can be gained. Furthermore, it is not clear that this thesis has an answer to one of the 
initial responses we considered to the charge that insulating criminal justice policy is 
anti-democratic: the response that says that something like a sentencing commission 
would be perfectly legitimate and democratic if appointed by a democratically-elected 
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legislature. To undermine that claim we would need a further argument to show, e.g. 
that elections do not really confer legitimacy on decisions made by the elected.18 
 
C. The Fairness Thesisµ:KHUHWKHUHLVFRQWLQXLQJDQGIXQGDPHQWDOGLVDJUHHPHQW
regarding political decisions amongst people who are not obviously incompetent or 
merely careless, the fairest response to such disagreement is to allow the decision to 
be made in such a way that each person has exactly the same say as any other ± that 
LVWKURXJKRQHSHUVRQRQHYRWH¶ 
 
This kind of thesis has been advanced in a different legal context by Jeremy 
Waldron.19 It claims that, regardless of the expected quality of the decision, there are 
grounds for submitting controversial political decisions to a democratic process, for in 
that way a fair result emerges. This thesis can be used to explain why it can be 
appropriate to submit issues to democratic decisions even if it were the case that 
democratic decisions were more likely to get it wrong than other available methods: 
for democratic decisions have the virtue of fairness, or of treating each person as 
mattering equally with everyone else when it comes to the issue in question. This is 
not quite the developmental theory of democracy considered by Held ± since there is 
not the claim that democracy is inherently good by virtue of developing valuable 
characteristically human capacities ± but there is the claim that there is something 
inherently valuable in a decision procedure that treats each participant equally; and as 
a result this thesis explains why there might be something important about allowing 
decision-making by public participation even where it is not an optimal pursuit of the 
VWDWH¶VSURWHFWLYHIXQFWLRQV 
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One criticism of the Fairness Thesis might be to ask whether it does not lead to the 
unpalatable conclusion that even complex empirical matters, if they bear on questions 
of the exercise of political power, can only fairly be resolved by means of one person 
one vote. Let me explain this briefly. First of all, the Fairness Thesis has a restricted 
VFRSHQRUPDOO\ZHGRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWDOOGHFLVLRQVVKRXOGEHPDGHE\HTXDOYRWLQJ± 
expert decision-making has some role (a doctor should decide which medicine you 
are to take, for instance). So the question is what its scope is. The most obvious way 
to distinguish which decisions are subject to the Fairness Thesis and which (like the 
GRFWRU¶VDUHQRWLVWRSRLQWWRWKHH[HUFLse of collective political power (i.e. the power 
of the state, seen as an agent of the people). The procedural fairness of a decision 
becomes important in circumstances where it is the exercise of power that should in 
principle belong to all of us that is at issue. The issue is then, not just whether that 
power is exercised wisely, but whether it is exercised fairly. However, the problem 
arises if there are questions about the exercise of state power that can only be 
answered with reference to complex evidence that only experts can properly assess. 
Take for instance the question whether longer prison sentences reduces crime. This 
bears on the exercise of political power. Is there something to be said for the fairness 
of opening this question up to public decision? Surely this is a conclusion that should 
be left to those competent to assess it. If the Fairness Thesis implies otherwise, this 
suggests that the Fairness Thesis is false. 
 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that we should draw from this criticism is not that the 
Fairness Thesis fails, but that an argument needs to be provided to tell us which types 
of decisions considerations of fairness apply to and why. The Fairness Thesis does 
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seem to succeed in establishing that fairness as well as accuracy counts in the 
assessment of at least some decisions, in some contexts. 
 
The overall thrust of A-C, then, is that there are some democratic values that could be 
FRPSDWLEOHZLWK/DFH\¶VSURSRVDORIGHPRFUDWLFGHOHJDWLRQEXWWKDWFRXOGEHVHUYHG
just as well, or even better, by public participatory mechanisms. But can we go further 
in support of Dzur? 
 
D. The Efficacy Thesisµ3XEOLFVXSSRUWLVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHHIIHFWLYHIXQFWLRQLQJRI
the criminal justice system, and is best brought about by having the public participate 
ZLWKLQWKDWV\VWHP¶ 
 
This thesis makes two controversial claims that would need further support. First of 
all, that public support is necessary, and secondly that it is best brought about through 
public participation. In support of the first, one might point to the fact that officials 
themselves need to some extent to believe in the values of the system; and public 
input and cooperation is needed at many stages. In support of the second, one might 
point to the distance that can open up when the system becomes (or is perceived to 
have become) autonomous. However, it is also true that modern citizens have become 
quite used to centralized agencies as well as large private companies taking care of 
much of the business of everyday life. Of course, there is a large debate about whether 
VXFKDVWDWHRIDIIDLUVDOORZVµLQVXODWHG¶LQVWLWXWLRQVWRKDYHJUHDWSRZHUZLWKRXW
accountability. But at least sometimes, it might be said, autonomy from public 
opinion is clearly no bad thing, since it enables public institutions to practice moral 
leadership ± which they have done in the U.K. for instance by prohibiting capital 
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punishment in the face of public opinion. So the argument over the Efficacy Thesis is 
not settled ± though it may be strengthened by combination with some of the further 
theses below. 
 
E. The Civic Schoolhouse Thesis.20 µ+DYLQJJUHDWHUSXEOLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQGHFLVLRQ-
making in institutions like criminal justice helps to increase civic virtue in two 
important ways. First of all, it confronts citizens with the genuine difficulties and 
complexities of decision-making, and hence leads to a greater understanding of the 
challenges faced by representatives and officials, and helps to reduce disillusionment 
and disconnection between the two. And secondly, it makes citizens more adept at the 
kinds of skills of civic political thinking that officials need to employ, skills that are 
essential for the day-to-day business of (self-JRYHUQPHQW¶ 
 
With this thesis we broach one of the sources of the view that political participation is 
part of the human good ± and hence the source of the developmental conception of 
democracy canvassed earlier. Political participation enriches human life, in part due to 
the acquisition of new and important skills, and in part by increDVLQJRQH¶VDZDUHQHVV
of the complexity around one. One of the main charges that could be made against 
this point is naïve optimism about the transformational potential of political 
engagement. Are citizens really likely to be shaken out of apathy and mutual 
suspicion by being given serious responsibility? Or is that simply to hand over the 
IDWHRIWKRVHEHLQJGHFLGHGDERXWWRSHRSOHZKRVLPSO\ZRQ¶WWDNHLWVHULRXVO\"
Evaluation of juries is of course controversial.21 Two things that might count in 
favour of the Civic Schoolhouse Thesis, but about which we would need more 
evidence, are a) whether the imposition of responsibility can, in favourable 
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circumstances, have the effect of encouraging people to deliberate seriously, and b) 
whether the fact that jury responsibility is one-off (or at any rate occasional or 
episodic) prevents it from becoming routine, and hence leaves jurors sensitized to the 
responsibility they bear. Some evidence about this might come from the literature on 
restorative justice.22 However, the last word at present might perhaps be given to Lord 
McCluskey: 
 
µ1RZEHIRUHWKLVGLVFXVVLRQEHJDQLIWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORUZLOOSHUPLWPHKH
said that many people ± members of the public ± they want to hang and they 
want to castrate and cut off the hands of thieves and things like that. My 
experience is that that may be what the people in the street think about crimes 
they read about in the papers but once they come into court and sit for several 
days, or even several weeks, they see the accused person, listen to the 
evidence, they discover the multi-faceted aspects of the case. Then they 
emerge as rational, judgemental human beings, and not the people who are 
VFUHDPLQJIRUWKHVFDIIROG¶23 
 
F. The Correction Thesisµ&RQWUDU\WRWKHFODLPWKDWWKHSXElic lack expertise, there is 
a clear role for non-technical evaluative decisions at every stage of the criminal 
process, and there is no reason to think that the public would be less accurate in 
making such decisions than public officials. Indeed, a group like a jury may be more 
likely to be able to come up with accurate decisions for a number of reasons having to 
do with the biases that can affect those who operate within institutions. These may 
include: i) the fact that expert discretion and judgement are often exercised 
individually, whereas the jury would benefit from explicit collective deliberation 
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LQYROYLQJDUDQJHRISHUVSHFWLYHVDQGZKHUHRQHSHUVRQ¶VYLHZFDQEHFKDOOHQJHGE\
others and improved, allowing a decision to be reached in which that range of 
perspectives are taken into account; ii) the fact that experts may become desensitized 
WRWKHKXPDQUHDOLW\WKDWWKH\DUHGHDOLQJZLWKDVLQGLYLGXDOVEHFRPHµFDVHV¶RU
µFOLHQWV¶DVVLPLODWHGWRDVKRUW-cut or stereotype that allows for efficient but distorting 
WUHDWPHQWZKHUHDVDMXU\RIRQH¶VSHHUVPD\EHPRUHOLNHO\WRGHDOZLWKWKHFDVH
through fresh, untainted eyes; iii) the fact that experts are constrained by institutional 
procedures that have to meet demands of generality, simplicity, clarity, and may 
therefore have to artificially leave important elements of the situation out of 
consideration ± e.g. to align the present decision with authoritative decisions in prior 
cases - whereas a jury could have the freedom and will to ignore such procedural 
FRQVWUDLQWVDQGDWWHQGWRWKHHVVHQFHRIWKHPDWWHULQKDQG¶ 
 
This argument says that public input into decision-making can correct for biases that 
in official-made decisions arising from individual discretion, routine desensitization 
and procedural distortions. How could this thesis be established? The argument 
requires a) some criterion of correctness for decision-making; and b) comparative 
evidence regarding the performance of experts in institutions and the performance of 
lay people, controlled to ensure that only the relevant variables are being tested. It is 
probably unlikely that we have such evidence, or could get it.24 However, the thesis 
relies on claims about the kinds of distorting forces that are at work on those who fill 
institutional roles. And it must also rest on a certain assessment ± again hard to 
imagine how we would verify ± of the moral competence of the average member of 
the public. Set against the Correction Thesis, one would have to consider a more 
positive view of institutions as in principle progressively learning repositories for 
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good practice regarding social needs and challenges. This might in turn require a 
wider consideration of professions and their role in a democracy.25 Dzur does not 
reject this more positive view entirely ± his view is that public input needs to take 
place under the aegis of institutions, and that juries should not be free to disregard 
institutional constraints altogether. Even if the thrust of the Correction Thesis is 
accepted, on the question of exactly where to find the just balance between institution 
and lay input, the devil will be very much in the detail. 
 
G. 7KHµ5XOHRI0HQ1RW/DZ¶7KHVLV. 26 µ7KLVWKHVLVUHYHUVHVWKHWUDGLWLRQDOGLFWXP
trumpeting the rule of law.27 The idea of the rule of law is that the role of individual 
discretion should be reduced and replaced by the determination of outcomes by 
JHQHUDOUXOHVWKDWDSSO\WRHYHU\RQH7KHµ5XOHRI0HQ¶WKHVLVKROGVWKDWLIWKH
removal of discretion goes too far then the only rights that can be claimed are those 
that meet purely institutional criteria of desirability (for instance, that they can be 
stated in a clear and generalizable rule that is not subject to counter-examples). This 
can distort the honest and open-minded appreciation of the relevant features of the 
LQGLYLGXDOFDVH7KHµ5XOHRI0HQ¶7KHVLVWKHUHIRUHKDVDQHSLVWHPLFDVSHFWWRLW
according to which being free from procedure can make it more likely that an 
accurate decision will be arrived at. But there is also a normative component, 
concerning the quality of interaction between the representative of the institution and 
those with whom they deal. A person who is treated a certain way because the rules so 
determine may feel that their situation has merely been treated as an instance of a 
rule, and that their individuality has been undermined. There is some value in a type 
of authentic human interaction in which the members of a jury are asked to respond 
directly to the humanity of the other ± and asked, not merely to follow the rules, but 
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also whether the rules do justice to the nature of the case. They are therefore asked to 
WDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHSHUVRQ¶VVLWXDWLRQLQVXFKDZD\DVWRSXW
them in a more direct ± and more valuable ± relation to that person than would be 
SRVVLEOHIRUDQRIILFLDOZKRVHFRQGXFWLVPHGLDWHGE\UXOHVDQGURXWLQH¶ 
 
7KHµ5XOHRI0HQ¶WKHVLVLVFRQQHFWHGZLWKDWKHPHRISUR-democracy theorising that 
has not been common in recent Anglo-American political theory but which flourished 
at the time of the New Left: the theme that institutions had become impersonal and 
bureaucratic, that some of our key relations and decisions are carried out 
automatically, efficiently, but with a sacrifice of those human characteristics that 
make them valuable ± characteristics to do, not so much with getting the right 
outcomes as with having the right sorts of interactions.28 The epistemic aspect of this 
thesis is connected to E(iii) above and claims that what is wrong with automatic, rule-
mediated interactions is that they get the wrong answer. But another part of the thesis 
claims that, even were it to be the case that merely following the rules would be more 
likely to get you to the right answer, there would still be independent value in the 
decision being made by authentic human scrutiny. This is one aspect of the 
developmental democracy thesis ± that there are some specifically political decisions 
the making of which through genuine scrutiny and care and the exercise of epistemic 
and moral virtues is inherently valuable.  
 
7KHµ5XOHRI0HQ¶WKHVLVDUJXHV± to some extent at least ± against the rule of law. 
One advantage of the rule of law is of course that it means that people have rights that 
can be claimed in a court of law and are not subject to the gift or arbitrary say-so of a 
party who has power over the individual. The rule of law, it might be said, means that 
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WKHUHLVMXVWLFHDQGQRWPHUHFKDULW\+RZHYHUWKHµ5XOHRI0HQ¶7KHVLVDUJXHVWKDW
this argument for the rule of law presents a false dichotomy between either 
GRPLQDWLRQLQ3HWWLW¶VUHSXEOLFDQWHUPVRUHOVHIRUPDOLVP29 Rather what individuals 
coming before some public tribunal or decision-making body have a right to is an 
unfettered and honest consideration of their case, guided by all and only those 
considerations relevant to its just resolution: consideration, in other words, structured 
by the employment of epistemic and moral virtues such as honesty, conscientiousness, 
imagination, and so on. Leaving room for this possibility means leaving room for 
discretion and judgement rather than taking the possibility of such judgement out of 
WKHWULEXQDO¶VKDQGV 
 
H. The Special Role Responsibility Thesisµ,QWKHFRQWH[WRIFHUWDLQYDOXDEOH
relationships, it is inappropriate to delegate certain activities or tasks to others, even if 
it is the case that those others will carry it out better. For instance, if paid nurses 
would care better for my elderly mother than I would myself, it is not enough if I 
simply leave it to them, or even if I supervise what they are doing. To some extent I 
have to be there, actively involved. This is partly because of the effect that my being 
there will have on my mother; but it would still apply even were she comatose or 
demented or otherwise unable to recognize me. Sometimes you just have a 
responsibility to do some things yourself rather than passing them off on to other 
people. Similarly this can happen in the case of democratic politics. Being a good 
citizen involves sharing the responsibility of maintaining social life. There can 
therefore be a limit to the extent to which we the people can ask delegated technical 
experts to do our business for us ± rather there are some things that (with the help of 
experts) we have to do for ourselves. That is part of being a good citizen. This 
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particularly applies to those most challenging and difficult decisions that a society has 
to make ± LWVµGLUW\EXVLQHVV¶LI\RXOLNH± such as crime. If as a society we are going 
to set up rules, enforce them, and punish those who break them, we should be 
prepared to deal directly with the consequences of doing so. Leaving it to a 
EXUHDXFUDF\WRGHDOZLWKZRXOGEHDQDEGLFDWLRQRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ 
 
This thesis and the last attempt together to get at the point Dzur draws from 
&KHVWHUWRQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHMXU\)RU']XUWKLVLVDSRLQWDERXWUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGWKH
need for non-evasion. The thesis rests on a view of citizenship as a role in a valuable 
relationship, a role that brings responsibilities the fulfillment of which can be part of a 
viable conception of the human good.30 To defend this thesis we would need to 
explain in what way citizenship is indeed an inherently valuable relationship ± for 
instance, by reference to the particular value and achievement of self-government. We 
would also need to defend the second part of the thesis, namely, that some 
responsibilities are such that one cannot pass them on but must carry them out 
oneself. This has the ring of truth in certain cases ± but how far does it generalize? 
Does the thesis show that there should be wide public participation in e.g. the health 
service, or in other essential public services in the way that Dzur argues there should 
be in criminal justice? Again, however, this thesis is part of a dissatisfaction we can 
associate with the New Left regarding the moral quality of our interactions in modern 
society ± that we are misled by the attractions of efficiency and convenience and fail 
to appreciate the way in which a richer conception of relations and responsibilities is 
leaching away. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
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We opened this paper with a consideration of the argument over the compatibility 
with democracy of a concrete policy proposal ± the setting up of a sentencing 
commission staffed by legal and criminological H[SHUWV:HORRNHGDW/DFH\¶V
argument that such a proposal would not be problematically in conflict with 
democratic values. In opposition to Lacey, we saw that Dzur claims, effectively, that 
such a response would mis-read the problem of penal populism, and that it would fail 
to solve the problem and may even exacerbate it. For Dzur, we need greater public 
HQJDJHPHQWUDWKHUWKDQOHVV,QVHFWLRQRIWKLVSDSHU,KDYHDUJXHGWKDW']XU¶V
argument can be read as having something like the following structure: allowing for 
JUHDWHUSXEOLFHQJDJHPHQWLVPRUHOLNHO\WRVROYHWKHSUREOHPVWHUPHGµSHQDO
SRSXOLVP¶WKDQZRXOG/DFH\¶VSURSRVDORIWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIH[SHUWVKRZHYHUHYHQ
if it does not, it will have independent value. I then listed eight claims that Dzur might 
PDNHLQEDFNLQJXSWKLVDUJXPHQW,GRQRWFODLPWRKDYHGHIHQGHG']XU¶VYLHZ± 
indeed, in some cases I have shown that there are important counter-arguments that 
ZRXOGQHHGWREHDGGUHVVHGEHIRUH']XU¶VFODLPVFRXOGEHHVWDEOLVKHG0\PDLQ
concern has been to clarify the ground on which the arguments have to proceed.  
 
I have also sought to articulate two theses ± WKHµ5XOHRI0HQQRW/DZ¶DQGµ6SHFLDO
5ROH5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶7KHVHV± that might be used in defence of some kind of 
participatory democracy, and which have, I think, been overlooked in the recent 
revival of interest in Anglo-American democratic theory. These are theses associated 
with the New Left and its concern that the dominance of instrumental, economic or 
bureaucratic rationality in contemporary society is leading to the decline of other, 
richer forms of human interaction. This is a theme that I have not developed in any 
detail in this paper, but which it seems to me would repay further inquiry. 
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Before concluding, I would briefly like to illustrate this point with reference to what 
)HHOH\DQG6LPRQKDYHFDOOHGµWKH1HZ3HQRORJ\¶31 The New Penology, Feeley and 
Simon claim, involves a move away from traditional legalistic forms of criminal 
justice resting on culpability and sanction ± as well as more humanitarian forms of 
criminal justice based in care for the offender and rehabilitation ± and towards a 
penology based more on a) assessing and managing high-risk offenders, in short 
quantification, and b) systemic and formal rationality.32 Without going into detail 
DERXW)HHOH\DQG6LPRQ¶VFODLPVZHPLJKWDVNLIWKH\DUHFRUUHFWZKDWZRXOGEH
wrong with this shift? My thought is that the position Dzur is articulating ± in 
SDUWLFXODUWKHµGHYHORSPHQWDO¶WKHVHV)DQG*± can explain why this form of criminal 
justice represents a kind of degradation of an important form of interaction that we 
have a responsibility to maintain between our fellow citizens. Rather than being 
treated as individuals, offenders and potential offenders are treated as risk-factors to 
be managed and taken account of. It is a long way from being called to answer to a 
WULEXQDORIRQH¶VSHHUV 
 
Although this paper has been concerned with the debate over penal populism, then, it 
is possible to see penal populism as only one of the problems currently facing the 
development of criminal justice, and perhaps not the most important one. Attempting 
to solve the problem of penal populism by further removing criminal justice from the 
ideal of open honest reactions between free individuals may yet turn out to be a step 
in the wrong direction.33 
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